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group of medical doctors had conducted experiments
on cyclists and had a scientific meeting on the subject
dwing the Tokyo Games. De Merode used some of the
information, developed by one of these, Albert Dirjx.
to raise thellissue at an IOC Session in the mid-I960s.
The Presiient,Avery Brundage, arrd the Chairrnan ofthe
first Medical Commission, Arthur Porritt, were aware of
doping and had promised to address it, but were taking
their time to report to the Session or develop any pol-
icies. When Porritt flnally presented his flndings in 1967
he also offered his resignation, allowing de Merode to be
presented as his successor.
The Belgian Prince clearly had more motivation than
Porritt, and quickly developed ateam of expeds, secured
funding for their expenses, and helped progress the testing
for amphetamines at the 1968 Games. However, he did
not have Brundage's full support: the President making
it clear in several missives to de Merode and tle other
IOC members, that he did not envision the IOC taking
ful1 responsibility for testing or the Medical Commission
increasing in size or power. A sympathetic interpreiation
The ambiguous role of Prince Alexandre de Merode
Paul Dimeot y'y Thomas Hunt
f rom the sixties, the Oll,rnpic Cames hecame one of
I the visible and intemational battlegrounds on dnrgs
in sport . This is not to say that other areas were not
important .Elite level events in cycling, athletics, weight-
lifting and other sports provided key moments, scandals
and a catalyst for policy changes. However, the histori-
cal and cultural symbolism of the Olympics charged the
doping question with more significance than any other
event or sport ever did. While a number of critical his-
tories have detailed the failings and sttuggles in the IOC's
fight against doping,': none has directly asked the ques-
tion ,What was the contribution of the man who held the
most important position in global anti-doping for over
30 years? Prince Alexandre de Merode was Chairman of
the IOC Medical Commission from 1967 until his death
rn2002.
His presence in this history is full of ambiguity from
the outset.
De Merode was a young, up-and-coming IOC member
when he realised in 1964 tlat doping was become a major
problem for the Olympic movement. In that year, a small








of Brundage's stance would highlight that there were
other major issues facing the IOC in the late 1960s and
lfuough the 1970s, and that he did not have the financial
resources oflater Presidents. De Merode took on a public
position which he retained tbroughout his career: doping
was wrong, the IOC were determined to fight it, yes there
were challenges ahead, but with research, good policies
and determination they would succeed. Yet, de Merode
was never fully committed
to a hard line, and failed
to create watertight rules
on consistent penalties for
offenders. Perhaps most
toubling was his tendency
to maintain an optimistic
position despite growing
evidence that drug use
was becoming more wide-
spread in the Games.
An early example of
this ambiguity comes from
1968 when he announced
that the small number of
positive tests meant that
the Games were clean
while using the threat of
doping to justiSr increas-
ing the scope of testing
procedures. By 1972, the
costs inYolved in anti-
doping measures were troubling IOC Members and the
new President, Lord Killanin. De Merode must have felt
threatened by their criticisms, but neverflinched from the
policy of keeping the Games clean. We now know that
by the early 1970s, the use of steroids was widespread,
yet there was no test to detect them in an athlete's blood
or urine sample. So, people in sport at that time knew
the arti-doping measures were an expensive farce whose
only achievement was to present the rhetoric of inten-
tion rather than a real deterent. Sadly, for de Merode, he
was the public face of this superficial strategy. Even w a
test for steroids was introduced( in 1976) it caught very
few athletes.lt was easy to cheat the testers by stopping
taking the drugs around three weeks before the event. Yet
after the Montreal , De Merode declared aiier the that
the Medical Commission were winning the wax against
drugs and doing everything in tleir power to face up to
present and future problems. He was also aware that the
unintended consequence was to create what the athletics
coach and historiarr Tom McNab would later call a 'clan-
destine indushy' of doping iffrovation. He was not pre-
pared at this stage to publicly address the apparent flaws
in the approach to doping taken by the IOC.
When the Games were held in Moscow, de Merode
had reassuralce from the hosts and fiom one ofhis own
advisors, Professor Amold Beckett, that the most up-to-
date equipment was available and the procedures were
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correct. There were no positive tests and he once again
declared the Olympics 'pure'and 'cleaa'. Krowing what
we do now about the doping practices at the time, this
does not show Merode in a good light.Subsequent ests
showed that at least sixteen gold medallists had used
testosterone.
The best we can say, then, about de Merode's approach
is that it was well-intentioned. Therefore we misht have
some sympathy for his struggles both within the IOC and
outside. However, a more plausible interpretation is that
de Merode found himself in a position where he had to
give 'lip sewice'to a policy that he knew was a failure.
He could not abandon it but neither could he make it a
success. He might have done more to secwe the co-oper-
ation of Intemational Federations and National Olympic
Cornmittees, or to have funded more research and edu-
cation, or indeed to have reflected more seriously on the
strat€gic reasons why anti-doping was failing. Howevel
the policy was now in place and the lailings ofthe 1960s
and 1970s would lay the loundations for later problems.
It is an irony of history that pieces of evidence con-
ceming recent events axe often more difncult to ident-
ii/ than those pertaining to earlier periods. National gov-
emments and many pdvate organizations, including the
IOC, restrict access to documents produced in recent
decades. This makes it difflcult to evaluate de Merode's
later career We do know, however, that de Merode,
perhaps having been embarrassed by his statements in
Moscow, began to aggressively lobby for pre-competi-
tion drug screening soon after leaving the ciry Having
realized that his Medical Commission remained organiz-
ationally weak within the structure of intemational sport
govemance , he also urged the IOC leadership to give the
body additional powers.















de Merode was confronted with two men who had other
priorities.Both IOC
President Juan Antonio Samaranch and Organizing
Committee Chaiman Peter Ueberroth were both con-
cerned witb the financial cost of drug testing. A number
of test results were apparently shredded after the sale
in which they were contained was emptied. As a result,
only 12 athlete failed doping tests in Los Angeles. None
were American.While de Merode was accused by some
as bearing primary responsibility for the episode, perhaps
a more reasonable a interpretation is that the financial
pressures on the organising committee meant that insuf-
ficient funds were made available for the samples to be
stored in an appropriately secure environment. The IOC
and LAOOC were delighted by the economic retums
ftom the Games , but the attitude to the medical commis-
sion left De Merode exposed and lacking the resources
to implement an effective anti-doping strategy in Los
Angeles.
The public criticism which followed the loss of test
results in Los Angeles produced a more receptive politi-
cal environment for anti-doping regulation. Although
de Merode's Medical Commission gathered momentum
over the next few years, it took a dramatic scandal at the
1988 Seoul Games to truly produce a major shift in the
IOC's perception ofthe problem. Canadian sprinter Ben
Joblson's positive test for anabolic steroids after winning
the l00m Final in World Record time. This served as a
wake-up call to the IOC leadership. More specifically,
fear ol govemmental intervention caused the IOC to
more carefully consider the strategies put forward by
the Medical Commission chairman. Indeed- with the
Johnson scandal having shown that spofis officials had
mismaraged the problem ofdoping lor years, de Merode
seemed to gain confidence, and he sometimes even
expressed public disapproval of Samaranch's actions on
doping subjects. From that point forward, the Medical
Commission chairman took a stronger managerial role
in urging Samaranch and the rest of the IOC to agree
to a universal set of drug policies. In fact, de Merode's
endorsement ofan anti-doping charler to be signed by all
national and intemational sports organizations aliliated
with the IOC would become perhaps his greatest legacy.
In calling also for the creation of a new anti-dop-
ing commission, de Merode moreover understood the
necessity for healthier coordination among the vadous
bodies ofthe Olympic govemance structure if the battle
against doping was to succeed.lnit ially he thought this
body would remain under IOC control, but the idea
would eventually give fise to the establishment of the
tully independent World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA).
In the decade pdor to that meeting, de Merode coltinued
to steer the IOC through controversy, although he some-
times revefied back to the IOC's old habit of address-
ing doping questions in terms of image management.
Still, his supporl for independent ovemight of Olympic
drug controls was crucial to the founding of WADA in
November 1999. With his health failing in the aftermath
of this landmark event,his role as Medical Commission
chairman authority was taken over by Dick Pound, the
incoming president of the new agency. Having led the
effort in the battle against doping for more than three
decades, de Merode died in November 2002.
De Merode's handling of IOC doping control there-
fore leaves an ambiguous legacy. On the one hand, he
ovenaw a number ofadvancements, including the estab-
lishment of a prohibited substances l ist in the 1960s, the
incorporation of anabolic steroid tests during the next
decade, and the drive toward a universal set of doping
policies in later years. Yet, the historical record suggests
that de Merode was a fairly weak administrator, and that
he was relatively unsuccessful in overcoming the hostility
of other IOC memben to effective protocols. Moreover.
de Merode's lack of scientific training left him unable to
anticipate future developments. While these traits alone
did not doom the fight against drugs in sport,together
they were difficult to overcome. Nevedheless, historians
should remember that de Merode's failures in the battle
against doping were not of his own design. Indeed, he
probably wished lor a better system. In the end, though,
de Merode was incapable of creating an effective anli-
doping franework. r
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